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This  paper  examines  firms’  access  to  bank  and  market  finance  when 
allowance  is  made  for  differences  in  firm-specific  characteristics.  A 
theoretical model determines the characteristics such as size, risk and debt 
that  would  determine  firms’  access  to  bank  or  market  finance;  these 
characteristics  can  result  in  greater  (or  lesser)  tightening  of  credit  when 
interest  rates  increase.  An  empirical  evaluation  of  the  predictions  of  the 
model is conducted on a large panel of UK manufacturing firms. We confirm 
that  small,  young  and  risky  firms  are  more  significantly  affected  by  tight 
monetary conditions than large, old and secure firms.    
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1. Introduction 
A considerable body of literature has explored the credit channel of monetary transmission under 
imperfect  information  including  papers  by  Bernanke  and  Blinder  (1988),  Romer  and  Romer 
(1990), Friedman and Kuttner (1993), Bernanke and Gertler (1995) to mention just a few. The 
influence of this channel is felt through the balance sheet (Gertler and Gilchrist, 1994), the effects 
of bank lending on those firms that are particularly bank dependent (Kashyap, Stein and Wilcox, 
1993)  and  through  the  stimulation  of  endogenous  cycles  or  accelerator  effects  (Fuerst,  1995; 
Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997, Bernanke et al., 1999). Financial health is used as an indicator to 
determine  firms’  access  to  external  funds  and  therefore  when  monetary  policy  tightens  real 
variables  such  as  employment,  production,  sales,  investment  and  inventory  accumulation  are 
influenced not only by higher interest rates but also by a contracting credit supply (Fazzari et al., 
1988, Guariglia and Schiantarelli, 1998, Nickell and Nicolitsas, 1999, and Guariglia, 1999). The 
point here is that the influence of information asymmetries can be understood by observing firm-
specific characteristics that are good proxies for financial health. Since these characteristic vary 
considerably the effects of monetary policy contractions are unlikely to be uniform across firms. 
In fact, the question of just how important for economic activity access to credit might be, and 
which firms are most affected by it, is an important issue for monetary policy makers. Our paper 
tackles this subject. 
Early attempts to measure the influence of policy tightening on the level of bank lending 
did not distinguish between demand-side influences, operating through the liabilities side of banks 
balance sheets (via the interest rate channel), and supply shifts, and therefore could not establish 
beyond doubt that there was a separate credit channel.  But a seminal contribution by Kashyap et 
al. (1993) isolated the influence of monetary policy contractions on bank lending by measuring 
the relative changes of bank lending to non-bank sources of funds. They did so by constructing a 
‘mix’ variable defined as the ratio of bank lending to total external finance (bank lending plus 
commercial paper). With such a relative measure based on the mix the effect of the interest rate 
channel on all types of finance could be distinguished from a credit channel on bank lending 
alone. When Kashyap et al. (1993), using US data, showed that the mix between bank lending 
and market-based finance declined with a monetary contraction they provided strong support for 
the credit channel in general and the bank lending channel in particular.    3
Subsequent work by Oliner and Rudebusch (1996) has criticized Kashyap et al.  (1993). 
While they were convinced by the use of a mix variable to capture the relative adjustment in the 
financial portfolio, they were unsure whether Kashyap et al. (1993) had used the correct mix. 
They argued that the original mix variable did not take into account a sufficiently wide range of 
alternative sources of finance and did not account for differential effects on small as opposed to 
large firms. Small firms are almost entirely bank dependent and therefore their mix is likely to be 
invariant  to  the  monetary  policy  stance.    With  a  wider  measure  of  alternative  funds  and  a 
distinction between small and large firms, Oliner and Rudebusch (1996) showed that there was 
less evidence for a bank lending channel than had been originally supposed. Nevertheless, they 
found  that  the  broad  credit  channel,  which  implies  that  all  sources  of  funds  contract 
simultaneously as monetary policy tightens, leaving the mix unaffected, does exist. 
Kashyap et al. (1996) responded to this critique by arguing that the re-interpretation of 
Oliner and Rudebusch (1996) was misleading. The implication that the mix does not respond to 
monetary policy when the data is disaggregated, they argued, is entirely expected for small firms 
(because they are bank dependent at all times) and an artefact of the different measure of the mix 
for large firms. When Kashyap et al. (1996) recalculated the effects for small and large firms 
using their own definition of the mix their original results were upheld.  
The interchange between Kashyap et al. (1993, 1996) and Oliner and Rudebusch (1996) is 
far from a minor dispute. It touches on an important issue for this paper – the influence of firm-
specific characteristics on the response to monetary contractions. If factors such as the size of the 
firm – to take the characteristic chosen by Oliner and Rudebusch (1996) – can have an influence 
on the composition of finance, then other characteristics may also alter access to credit. In other 
words, why consider only size? In their conclusion Kashyap et al. (1996) note that there is ‘more 
to be learned from careful analysis of a variety of micro data, at the level of both individual banks 
and individual firms’ (p. 313), and we agree. Now that micro data is accessible on other aspects of 
firm  characteristics,  such  as  their  real  assets,  perceived  riskiness  and  indebtedness,  in  panels 
spanning periods of both tight and benign monetary policy, we can consider their effects. The 
influence  of  the  above  factors  on  firms’  access  to  bank  versus  market-based  finance,  after  a 
change in monetary policy, is the point that the present paper addresses.  
 We begin by presenting a simple theoretical model that allows us to derive a taxonomy of 
firms according to their source (if any) of external finance based on their characteristics. Then we   4
examine access to credit under this taxonomy. Our modelling approach follows Bernanke and 
Gertler (1989), Diamond (1984) and Williamson (1987) who adopt Townsend’s (1979) costly-
state verification framework. Banks in this environment have the ability to monitor their clients 
and thus verify the returns of their projects.
1  In contrast, capital markets (bondholders) are unable 
to do so because of the free-rider problem. As a result, only firms with healthy balance sheets are 
able to borrow from the capital market. Undercapitalized firms are forced either to borrow from 
banks and raise funds at higher interest rates that reflect the cost of monitoring, or self-finance 
their projects. Monetary policy can affect the access of firms to external finance because it alters 
the cost of funds. Crucially, from the point of view of our paper, we are interested to know how 
these effects depend on those firm characteristics that credit providers use to identify creditworthy 
applicants. Examples of the kind of characteristics that we have in mind are size, total assets, the 
ratio of tangible to intangible assets, credit ratings, profitability and gearing. The predictions from 
our model are evaluated for a panel of 16,000 manufacturing firms in the UK. Our results show 
that the more financially vulnerable firms – smaller, younger, more risky and more indebted firms 
– are more severely affected by monetary tightening as credit supply is withheld. Thus we offer 
empirical  support  for  the  theoretical  model,  and  can  quantify  the  effects  of  particular 
characteristics on access to external finance.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our theoretical model that is used to 
explore  the  influence  of  firm-specific  characteristics  on  the  variation  in  the  composition  of 
external finance as a consequence of contractions and expansions in monetary policy. The data 
sources  and  empirical  methodology  are  discussed  in  Section  3  followed  by  the  estimations. 
Section 4 concludes. 
 
2.   The Theoretical Model 
We assume that firms own assets which consist of tangible collateral assets (C) and intangible 
assets. The liability side of their balance sheets consists of equity and debt (D
S). The latter is 
senior relative to any new (junior) debt (D
J), in the sense that it will be paid off first in the case of 
                                                            
1 The ability to monitor is also what distinguishes banks from capital markets in Besanko and Kanatas (1993), Boot 
and Thakor (1997), Diamond (1991), Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1993) and 
Repullo and Suarez (2000). However, in these models monitoring allows banks to alleviate a moral hazard problem 
related to the choice of technologies by firms.    5
default. Since any new finance will be junior to all existing debt raised previously, at the margin 
the availability of market finance will rest on the likelihood that junior debt will be repaid. 
New projects require an initial investment F (project size) and generate financial payoffs 
kF  (k>1)  with  probability  p  and  zero  with  probability  1-p.  We  assume  that  the  projects  are 
socially efficient, i.e. pkF>F. Firms need to raise external funds to finance new projects. Firm 
owners  and  potential  creditors  are  risk  neutral.  All  financial  markets  are  competitive.  The 
opportunity cost of funds is given by the riskless interest rate r, which is also the operational 
variable of monetary policy used by the Bank of England to target inflation.  
Following Townsend (1979), we assume that only firm owners can costlessly observe 
project returns. Monitoring the activities of firms allows creditors to verify the returns reported 
by  firm  owners,  but  monitoring  is  costly  and  only  banks  find  it  profitable  to  monitor  their 
clients.
2 
When firms default on their debt obligations, creditors can liquidate their tangible assets. 
We assume that the liquidation value of these assets is uncertain at the time when liquidation 
decisions are taken.
3 More specifically, with probability p the value of tangible assets is equal to 
CH  and  with  probability  1-p  is  equal  to  CL  (<CH).  Let  pCH+(1-p)CL=C  (i.e.  the  expected 
liquidation value is equal to the value of the tangible assets at the time when the financial contract 
is agreed). Finally, we assume that when liquidation takes place firms also lose any expected 
discounted continuation payoffs V.
4 For simplicity, we impose the following restrictions on the 









The first condition states that senior debt is riskless. The second sets a minimum level for the 
continuation payoffs. As we will show below, there is no loss of generality by imposing these 
                                                            
2 See Diamond (1984) for a costly-state verification model where financial intermediaries arise endogenously. 
3 In equilibrium liquidation values will be affected by the stance of monetary policy. As Schleifer and Vishny (1992) 
have pointed out it is during periods of recessions, when most of the bankruptcies take place, that liquidation values 
are at their lowest levels.   6
restrictions. We introduce them in order to eliminate some cases that would not further add any 
new insights to the analysis of our model. 
 
2.1. Market Finance  
In this section, we consider the case where the only source of external finance is the capital 
market.  Let  D
J
C  denote  the  amount  of  debt  raised  in  the  capital  market.  In  the  absence  of 
monitoring, firms might have an incentive to misreport their true payoffs. We begin with the 
following lemma: 
 
Lemma 1: If D
S+D
J
C>CH there exists a cut-off value V
* for the continuation payoffs such that if 
V<V
* firms will always default independently of their project’s payoff. 











In contrast, the expected payoff of a firm that always defaults is given by: 







In deriving the above expressions we take into account that payoffs are affected by whether or 
not liquidation takes place and by changes in the value of tangible assets. When firms default 
there are two possibilities: either the liquidation value is sufficiently high so that the proceeds 
cover the total debt obligations or the total payoff to the debtors is restricted by the liquidation 




C: In this case all debt is riskless. Since V is strictly positive we find 
that in this case firms never default when the project payoff is positive.  
Case 2: CH> D
S+D
J
C>CL: Subtracting (1) from (2) we find that condition 2 implies that in 




C>CH: Subtracting (1) from (2) we find that if V > D
S+D
J
C-C firms will not 





C-C.                                                                                                                                                                            
 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
4 To keep things simple we have restricted our attention to a static model. This is without any loss of generality, as 
long as the optimal financial decision at any time is independent of future investment opportunities. Nevertheless, we 
have introduced a continuation payoff in order to allow for risky capital market financing.   7
The  above lemma has established those conditions under which firms have the incentives to 
truthfully reveal their payoffs. From the proof it becomes clear that the imposition of conditions 1 
and 2 is without any loss of generality. If we remove condition 1 then we will have to consider 
the  effects  of  senior  debt  on  the  incentives  of  firms  to  default  but  would  not  change  the 
qualitative comparative statics derived below. Condition 2 implies that only in case 3 firms might 
have an incentive to misreport their payoffs. The following proposition follows directly from the 
above lemma: 
 




* firms will not be able to fund new projects in the capital 
market. 
Proof: Lemma 1 implies that when the above inequalities hold firms will default with certainty. 
In this case the expected liquidation proceeds will be less than the total debt obligations. Because 
senior debt is paid first the expected payoff of any new debt will be negative.                               
 
Proposition 1 sets a maximum value on the amount of junior debt that firms can raise in the 
capital market. Obviously, the amount of junior debt is endogenous and it depends on the size of 
the  project,  the  market  interest  rate  and  the  value  of  collateral.  Next,  we  calculate  D
J
C,  the 
available new finance from the capital market, and the rate of interest on new debt.  The zero 
profit condition for creditors requires that: 








S}) = (1+r)F 
Lemma 1 implies that we need to consider three cases. Solving for D
J
C we get: 







Even when the liquidation proceeds are low they are still sufficiently high to cover all debt and 
therefore junior debt covers the initial investment and the interest, where the effective interest 
rate on debt D
J
C/F is equal to the gross riskless interest rate. This last point is not surprising given 
that in this case debt is riskless. 
  Case 2: If CH> D
S+D
J










C implies that D
J
C>(1+r)F and therefore the effective interest rate on 
debt D
J
C/F is higher than the gross riskless interest rate.   8




* then the left-hand side of (3) is equal to 
pD
J
C + (1-p)(p( CH-D
S) + (1-p)(CL-D
S))  
Again, the inequality CH-D
S<D
J
C implies that D
J
C>(1+r)F and therefore the effective interest rate 
on debt D
J
C/F is higher than the gross riskless interest rate. Indeed the effective interest rate is 
higher than the corresponding rate in case 2. 
  Up to this point, we have established under what conditions firms can raise funds in the 
capital market, we have determined the risk level (if any) of these loans and have calculated the 
corresponding interest rates. Next, we turn our attention to intermediary finance. 
 
2.2. Intermediary Finance 
In contrast to capital markets, banks can monitor the activities of their clients and thus verify 
project  returns.  Townsend  (1979)  has  shown  that  when  monitoring  is  costly  the  optimal 
deterministic contract is the standard debt contract.
5 In our model, this means that banks verify 
project returns only when firms report that their projects have failed. Under the supposition that 
banks can impose sufficiently high penalties when firms misreport project returns, firms always 
have the incentive to report truthfully. We assume that the cost of monitoring M is an increasing 
function of the size of the project; i.e. M=m(F), m¢(F)>0.
6 
Monitoring costs make bank credit more expensive than credit from the capital market, 
therefore, the only firms that seek bank loans will be those that do not have access to the capital 
market. As we have demonstrated in the previous section, these are firms whose balance sheets 











B denote the amount of new debt owed to banks. The bank’s zero profit condition implies 
that the condition (3) in the previous section should be amended to include the expected 
monitoring costs, (1-p)m(F), such that: 
                                                            
5Townsend (1979) suggested that by expanding the set of admissible contracts to include stochastic ones we can 
improve the welfare of participants. Boyd and Smith (1994) compare and contrast the two types of contracts. Since 
there are only two states in our model without loss of generality we restrict attention to deterministic contracts. 
Allowing for stochastic contracts would mean that banks verify project returns, when firm owners report the low 
state, only probabilistically. This would reduce expected monitoring costs, and thus the interest rates that banks 
charge on their loans, but it would require that banks can impose very high penalties on those firms that do not report 
truthfully. If there is an upper limit on the penalties that banks can charge (even if you would never observe them in 
equilibrium) then we can focus on deterministic contracts. 
6 If we assume that monitoring costs do not vary with the size of project then the effective interest rate on debt will 
be decreasing in the size of the loan.   9
  pD
J
B + (1-p)(p( CH-D
S) + (1-p)(CL-D
S)) = (1+r)F+(1-p)m(F) 
Solving for D
J
B we get 
  (4)  D
J
B = {(1+r)F+(1-p)m(F) - (1-p)(p( CH-D
S) + (1-p)(CL-D
S))} / p 
Comparing the interest rates charged by banks to those offered by the capital market we find that 
the  former  are  higher  by  the  value  of  the  expected  monitoring  costs.  Notice  that  since  the 
expected payoff of firms is decreasing in D
J
B if m¢¢(F)>0 then there might be firms that are unable 
to break-even because of the high interest payments. Firms indifferent between investing and 
being inactive are those whose characteristics satisfy the following equality: 






B) = 0. 
These will be firms with very low values of collateral, high risk of default, large projects relative 
to their size, and high levels of accumulated debt. Firms with these characteristics might not be 
able to get access to external finance. 
 
2.3. Model Predictions 
We consider two sets of predictions arising from the model. First, we wish to know what the 
model  predicts  about  access  to  credit  at  the  margin  based  on  observable  firm-specific 
characteristics. This should tell us what creditors infer from factors such as size, profitability, 
risk, collateral and the debt to equity ratio about the viability of extending (further) short-term 
and  long-term  debt
7.  Second,  we  wish  to  know  what  the  model  predicts  about  the  effect  of 
monetary policy on the overall availability of external debt and how this effect varies with firm 
characteristics.  
We derive the first set of predictions from Proposition 1. We can infer that the higher the 
level of debt (either existing or new debt), the lower the level of future profitability (captured by 
V),  and  the  lower  the  value  of  intangible  assets  (collateral),  the  more  likely  it  is  that  new 
investments will be financed through short-term bank loans rather than by long-term debt from 
the markets. If existing debt levels indicate extreme vulnerability then firms may not obtain credit 
from either source.  
                                                            
7 Since short-term debt of maturity 1 to 5 years is dominated by bank loans (because the market for commercial 
paper is not as well developed as it is in the U.S.) we can make a distinction between finance raised predominantly 
from banks and finance from the capital market. Given also that adjustment at the margin affects the accumulated 
bank borrowing and market debt in relation to scalars such as total debt, total liabilities or turnover we consider 
ratios when we put these theoretical predictions to the test.   10
The value of new debt is endogenous and can be derived using the zero-profit condition 
for creditors given by (3) (or (4)). This condition implies that the value of new debt is positively 
correlated with the size of the project, the level of interest rates, the level of risk (captured by the 
inverse of p), and the value of existing debt. The zero profit conditions in each case imply that the 
value of new debt is negatively correlated with the level of collateral, and the level of economic 
activity (when the state of the economy is good there is a higher likelihood i.e. larger value of p 
that the value of collateral will be high).  
Our theoretical model also predicts that, other things equal, smaller firms are more likely 
to use bank loans to finance their projects. This is because larger firms might be expected, on 
average, to be characterized by higher collateral and debt values than smaller firms, therefore 
according to our model they will also be able to finance, on average, larger projects using market 
finance. Put differently, if we fix the size of investments then larger firms are more likely to 
finance  them  using  market  funds.  We  summarize  the  above  predictions  in  the  following 
Proposition: 
 
Proposition 2: Financing investments with bank loans, rather than raising funds in the capital 
market, is more likely when (a) the level of existing debt is high, (b) the level of collateral is low, 
(c) the level of risk is high, (d) the level of future profitability is low, and (e) the level of economic 
activity is low. Our model also predicts that, other things equal, larger firms are more likely to 
finance their projects with funds raised in the capital market. 
 
The second set of predictions relates to the impact of monetary policy on the overall 
availability of external debt. The following proposition is a direct consequence of the break-even 
condition (5): 
 
Proposition 3: The volume of market finance will be lower during periods of a tight monetary 
policy (high interest rates) relatively to periods of loose monetary policy, and the effects of a 
tightening of monetary policy will be stronger during periods of low economic activity. Firms 
that are most likely to be affected are those with (a) low expected profits (captured by either/both 
high risk (low p) or/and low profitability (low k)), and (b) low collateral, and (c) high debt levels. 
     11
In the remaining of this paper we test the above predictions and evaluate their relative impact on 
external credit in quantitative terms. 
 
3. An Application to UK Manufacturing Firms 
3.1 Data and Methodology 
The FAME database covers all UK registered companies offering up to 11 years of detailed 
information  (modified  accounts)  for  about  500,000  large,  small  and  medium  sized  UK 
companies. We construct a sample from the FAME Database that allows us some flexibility in 
analysing  the  monetary  transmission  mechanism  and  corporate  sector  finance.  The  sample  is 
extracted on the following criteria
8: 
·  Firms whose primary activity is classified as manufacturing according to 1992 SIC UK 
Code in England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland
 9. 
·  Firms established prior to 1989 and still reporting for the years 1999 and 2000
10.     
On this basis we extract 16,000 manufacturing firms with rich information about firm-specific 
characteristics. The logarithm of real total assets is used to indicate the impact of SIZE and is 
calculated by deflating nominal total assets by the relevant sectoral producer price index. Our 
measure of risk, RISK SCORE, is the QuiScore measure produced by Qui Credit Assessment 
Ltd, which assesses the likelihood of company failure in the twelve months following the date of 
calculation. The QuiScore is given as a number in the range 0 to 100; firms with scores above 
eighty are regarded as secure and those below forty are regarded as high risk.  
There are four other measures of firm-specific characteristics that we employ. We 
introduce AGE as an explanatory variable to measure the importance of track record for the 
change in the composition of firm external finance; the ratio of tangible assets to total assets to 
measure COLLATERAL available to support borrowing; the return to capital, PROFIT, which is 
                                                            
8 The sample is based on figures that were downloaded in October and November 2001. A sample selected at a 
different time but still using the same criteria is likely to be different because of monthly revisions of firm accounts. 
9 The software also includes 940 firms (5.7 percent of the total sample) whose secondary rather that the primary 
activity is classified in the manufacturing sector.  
10 In fact, only 3 percent of the firms in the manufacturing industry stopped reporting during the period of 1990-
1999. This may stem from either a failure of the company or because the company entered the exemption threshold. 
These drops are prevalent in the first couple of years of the sample period. Therefore, the sample is not a balanced 
panel, since firms whose turnover is under the threshold are not observed (the turnover threshold is £90,000).    12
a measure of profitability scaled by capital; and a measure of senior debt that is captured by 
GEARING, the ratio of total loans to shareholder funds as an indicator of indebtedness of firms 
in relation to their equity, and by DEBT(-1), which is debt outstanding at the end of the previous 
period.  
We now turn to our measure of the financial choice. The theoretical model has made 
predictions about the choice at the margin between bank borrowing and marketable debt, but in 
the tradition of Kashyap et al. (1993) and Oliner and Rudebush (1996), who used ratios of bank 
loans to total short term debt, we derive ratios that change with decisions at the margin. These 
help to abstract from demand-side influences to a degree because the factors that influence the 
uptake of credit from the demand side affect both numerator and denominator leaving the ratio 
relatively unchanged. Changes in the ratio are more likely to reflect the influence of the supply-
side. We have two measures of financial choice based on ratios corresponding to – short-term 
debt to total debt and total debt to total liabilities.
11 The former refers to access to market finance 
versus bank finance, where the majority of short term debt is bank finance, while the latter refers 
to the overall availability of external debt (i.e. total debt).
12 
Our  sample  offers  a  natural  experiment  to  evaluate  the  influence  of  firm-specific 
characteristics on the response of corporate finance to monetary policy. The first period of our 
sample, 1990-1992, was a tight episode, when monetary policy in the UK was dedicated towards 
maintaining the exchange rate within its target zone in the Exchange Rate Mechanism. The high 
rates  of  interest  in  Germany  post-reunification  and  the  perceived  weakness  of  sterling  as  a 
currency  contributed  to  keep  UK  interest  rates  high  during  this  period  in  order  to  meet  the 
external policy objective. The period coincided with a recession and a harsh environment for 
existing  and  new  corporate  borrowers.  The  second  period,  1993-1999,  witnessed  a  period  of 
sustained economic growth, falling unemployment and inflation, and interest rates that quickly 
approached very low levels in comparison to recent historical experience. The corporate sector 
experienced an improvement in net worth and borrowing conditions that were less constrained. 
We make use of this natural experiment by interacting the interest rate during tight and loose 
periods  of  monetary  policy  with  the  other  explanatory  variables.  Our  results,  reported  in  the 
                                                            
11 Short-term debt is made up of the sum of bank overdrafts, short term-group and director loans, hire purchase, 
leasing and other short-term loans, but is predominantly bank finance. Total liabilities is made of short-term debt, 
trade credit and total other current liabilities that include some forms of finance resembling commercial paper or 
bonds, long term debt and other long-term liabilities.   13
empirical  section,  show  that  there  was  a  marked  difference  in  the  response  to  firm  specific 
characteristics when interacted with monetary policy
13.  
We estimate the relationship between the financial choices of firms and their specific 
characteristics  using  a  standard  panel  model  that  enables  us  to  control  for  firm  specific 
unobservable effects and to account for firm heterogeneity. The format is: 
yit = a a a ai + Xitb  b  b  b + e e e eit  
where i = 1,2,…., N refers to a cross section unit (firms in this study), t = 1, 2,…..,T refers to time 
period. yit  and Xit  denote the dependent variable and the vector of non-stochastic explanatory 
variables for firm i and year t, respectively. e e e eit is the error term, and a a a ai  is a vector capturing firm-
specific intercepts. A preliminary investigation that compared estimates from a random effects 
model against a fixed effects alternative using the Hausman test rejected the hypothesis of no 
systematic difference between coefficients obtained from the two models. Therefore, we report 
the fixed effects, which are generally regarded as more efficient
14. We control for the economic 
cycle where necessary by including GDP as a regressor and for year effects using year dummies.  
 
3.2 Response to firms-specific characteristics and control variables 
In Table 1 we evaluate the (supply) response of short-term debt to total debt and total debt to total 
liabilities to firm-specific characteristics. The theoretical model predicts that the first measure, 
short-term  debt  to  total  debt  (which  comprises  mostly  bank  lending)  will  rise  for  smaller  or 
riskier firms, those with higher levels of debt and less collateral, and with lower profitability, 
while total debt will increase for larger, less risky, highly collateralized firms with evidence of a 
good return to capital. When we examine the empirical evidence for these effects we find that the 
predictions are confirmed in the data. We use the GDP growth rate to control for cyclical effects 
in aggregate level, since an increase in the GDP growth rate encourages firms to shift toward 
non-debt liabilities. There are significant time effects from dummies for 1992, 1993, 1996 (all 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
12 Our results were unchanged when we considered the ratios of short-term debt and total debt over total assets. 
13 We also considered the impact of a tight period dummy variable which we set equal to one for the period 1990-
1992. We do not report the results in the empirical section because they are almost identical to the results based on 
the interaction with the interest rate (they are available on request). 
14 Ideally we would like to report dynamic panel GMM-estimates such as those proposed by Arellano and Bond 
(1991), however, the requirement for instruments under GMM poses a problem for our study. The period when 
monetary policy was tight occurs only at the very beginning of our sample. If we were to make use of GMM those 
observations at the beginning of our sample would be lost, and the results would be indicative only of access to credit 
under a benign period of monetary policy. This would severely undermine the rationale for our empirical work, 
therefore we rely on fixed effects estimates.      14
negative, suggesting a shift towards long-term debt as interest rates fell to lower levels). The 
inclusion of these variables in our panel estimates control for remaining demand-side influences 
and time effects. 
We find strong positive evidence in favour of the theoretical model from our empirical 
application in Table 1. First, the logarithm of real assets, taken as an indicator of firm SIZE, is an 
important influence on the debt ratios. We observe that firms with more real assets tend to have 
greater  access  to  long-term  debt  and  reduce  their  short-term  debt,  hence  the  signs  of  the 
coefficient for the short-term debt to total debt ratio is negative and for the total debt to total 
liabilities is positive in response to SIZE.  
Second, for the RISK SCORE, we expect a negative sign on this measure indicating that 
safer firms will reduce short-term debt (note, our measure based on the QuiScore rating takes a 
higher value the less risky the firm is judged to be over the following twelve months). This is 
what  we  find,  and  the  negative  sign  on  total  debt  suggests  that  a  good  credit  rating  is  also 
associated with lower debt in general, possibly because these firms make greater use of non-debt 
finance.   
Third, the ratio of tangible assets in total (COLLATERAL) enhances access to longer-
term  debt,  reducing  the  proportion  of  short-term  to  total  debt  while  increasing  total  debt  in 
relation to total liabilities as predicted. 
Fourth we predict that senior debt has priority over junior debt in our theoretical model 
should the firm liquidate, and therefore firms with more senior debt are less likely to obtain 
further access to credit. This may result in less long term debt and greater borrowing in the short 
term  from  banks,  but  equally,  if  the  debt  level  is  high  enough  to  cast  doubts  over  a  firm’s 
viability, it may reduce all forms of debt. We measure senior debt using the conventional debt-to-
equity ratio (GEARING) but this has a negative influence on the proportion of short-term to total 
debt and a positive influence on total debt to total liabilities
15. Both coefficients although small, 
are  highly  significant,  and  they  indicate  that  short-term  debt  declines  and  long-term  debt 
                                                            
15 Concern that this finding could be the result of the construction of the dependent variable, since both the 
dependent variables contain total debt as denominator (numerator) while the explanatory variable also includes total 
debt in the numerator, led us to investigate further.  The results are unchanged if we make use of the level of debt 
outstanding at the end of the previous period TDEBT(-1) as the measure of senior debt so that there is no arithmetic 
reason for the dependent and the explanatory variables to be linked. The same results also held if we used other 
measures of senior debt scaled by real assets or turnover  (results not reported). We conclude that the finding is not 
simply obtained by construction of the variables.    15
increases,  which  accords  with  neither  of  the  scenarios  that  we  discussed  above,  but  further 
investigation of the impact of debt illustrates why this is the case. 
Higher levels of existing debt may deter creditors from offering further long-term credit 
for firms that are vulnerable on the basis of other characteristics besides debt. For these types of 
firms  long-term  debt  declines.  But  for  firms  that  are  healthy  on  the  basis  of  the  other 
characteristics, creditors may be willing to offer more debt as they have done in the past. For 
these firms greater debt does not indicate vulnerability, but rather is the consequence of their 
success in accessing credit previously. The type of credit that they are likely to obtain is typically 
long term debt. If the influence of the latter group outweighs the effects of the former on long-
term debt, we would observe growing total debt and declining short-term debt in response to 
higher debt levels.
16   
We illustrate this point in Table 1-B where we construct interactions between gearing and 
indicators that demonstrate that a firm is in the upper or lower tail of the distribution with respect 
to other characteristics (respectively firms above the 25th and below the 75th percentile of the 
distribution). Thus we can identify the firms that have high profits, low risk and high collateral, 
that are strong on other criteria other than debt levels, and compare the impact of gearing in their 
case with the firms that a weak on these criteria. Our results show that risky and highly geared 
firms in particular are not able to access long-term credit, but can obtain short-term credit, while 
firms that are secure and highly geared can access long-term credit.
17  
Two other variables need to be discussed. A good rate of return on capital  (PROFIT) 
should improve access to short term and long term debt. In practice we find that it improves 
access to short term debt but marginally reduces the ratio of total debt to total liabilities. A further 
variable, AGE, also appears to be a significant explanatory for both short-term and total debt. 
There is no prediction from our model concerning the impact of this variable, but the empirical 
finding  accords  with  the  predictions  of  other  models.  AGE  provides  a  confirmation  of  the 
importance of a track record for certain types of firms and this is a direct test of the relationship-
banking  proposition  suggested  by  Sharpe  (1990),  Diamond  (1991),  Rajan  (1992)  and  Boot 
                                                            
16 Note that this argument cannot be applied to other explanatory variables. Firms may be highly indebted because 
they are weak or because they are successful, and have obtained long-term credit in the past. We cannot think of 
unprofitable firms, or firms with low collateral in the same way.   
17 Other interacted criteria such as size and collateral assets seem less influential, since they have coefficients that are 
insignificantly difference from zero. Gearing interacted with low profit levels seems to reduce access to all types of 
credit, and vice versa for high profit.     16
(2000). Firms that are weak on other criteria but nevertheless have a track record are likely to be 
less financially constrained than firms that are younger and that have not been able to build 
relationships with their lenders.  
We find that monetary policy tightening (higher values of RATE) leads to a tightening of 
the  supply  of  debt  independently  of  firm-specific  characteristics.  In  all  cases  a  monetary 
tightening significantly reduces available credit as expected and this supports the broad credit 
channel (Oliner and Rudebusch, 1996). In the next sub-section we explore in much greater detail 
how a tightening of monetary policy alters the credit composition directly and indirectly through 
interaction with the firm-specific characteristics. 
3.3 Monetary Policy, Firm Characteristics and the Financial Mix  
Our main purpose in this section is to report how the response to firm-specific characteristics 
varies with monetary policy. We report our findings of the impact of monetary policy on credit 
ratios by constructing interactions between our explanatory variables and the interest rate. These 
interactive terms tell us how the response to these variables changes when monetary policy (and 
hence available external finance) tightens, as indicated by the level of the interest rate. We expect 
to find that the volume of market finance declines as the rate rises, and that smaller firms, those 
with low profits and collateral, higher risk and greater debt will be proportionately more affected. 
The results are reported in Table 2.  
We report two columns for each ratio to allow for the effects of inclusion and exclusion of 
GEARING. We find that there is no variation in the impact of GEARING as rates rise, and the 
responses to the other explanatory variables are unchanged by the exclusion of GEARING. For 
other variables there are significant differences in the response of creditors with rising rates. 
We find that the positive effects of SIZE lessen with higher levels of the interest rate. This 
means that being larger is less of an advantage in terms of gaining access to capital markets 
(smaller negative sign for the first ratio) and in terms of gaining more debt (smaller positive sign 
for the second ratio)
18 as monetary policy tightens.  Likewise, the effect of COLLATERAL is 
less advantageous during these periods, but is still strongly influential. 
A better RISK SCORE and a longer period of incorporation (indicated by AGE) are more 
advantageous  with higher interest rates in terms of reducing the short-term to total debt ratio 
                                                            
18 In all cases the effect of higher interest rates is found by adding the coefficient on the variable to the coefficient on 
the relevant interactive term e.g. the coefficient on AGE plus the coefficient on AGE*RATE.      17
(gaining access to the capital market) but less advantageous in gaining more total debt in relation 
to total liabilities. This reflects the fact that as rates rise the available stock of total debt is more 
constrained, but firms may still access longer term debt at lower rates of interest if they have 
better risk scores and are older.  
For GEARING and PROFIT, where the original effects were small and marginal, there is 
no evidence of a significant variation in response to higher levels of the interest rate.  
Very similar results were obtained for all these variables when we considered interactions 
with a dummy variable indicating tight policy for the period 1990-1992. This measure has some 
advantages in partitioning the data sample between ‘tight’ and ‘loose’ periods, but it does not 
indicate the degree of monetary tightness as the level of the interest rate does. However, because 
our results were almost identical this confirms that our findings are robust to the measure of 
tightness or looseness of monetary conditions.  
This section has shown that the responses by lenders to firm-specific characteristics differ 
with the level of the interest rate since size and collateral are less influential when credit markets 
are tightening, while risk scores and age become more important in these periods. We conclude 
that there is substantial evidence that the reaction to monetary policy varies considerably because 
of the influence of the credit channel and it depends heavily on firm-specific characteristics.   
 
4. Conclusions 
This paper has examined the proposition that credit provision varies across the monetary cycle 
according to firm specific characteristics. The foundation for the empirical findings is based on a 
theoretical framework that models access to credit within a costly state verification environment 
(Townsend,  1979).  External  finance  is  available  either  from  the  market  or  from  financial 
intermediaries where only the latter can verify project returns. By evaluating the creditworthiness 
of firms, external finance can be obtained from these two sources, provided certain zero-profit 
conditions are satisfied. These conditions determine the availability of credit and the rate charged 
for borrowing. Our application relies on specific predictions from this model that can be evaluated 
against a large panel of firm level data.  
The results show that smaller, more risky and younger firms are more noticeably affected 
by monetary tightening than larger, secure, or older firms. The role of asset size and especially 
tangible assets that can be used as collateral is strongly emphasized. The paper therefore confirms   18
the findings of major studies relating to the credit channel. Specifically, that there is a broad credit 
channel effect (Oliner and Rudebusch, 1996), as well as a bank-lending channel  (Kashyap et al. 
1993  and  Gertler  and  Gilchrist,  1994),  accelerator  effects  (Kiyotaki  and  Moore,  1997,  and 
Bernanke et al., 1996), and evidence consistent with relationship banking when age proxies for 
the development of such bank-firm relationships (Rajan, 1992, Berlin and Mester, 1999 and Boot, 
2000). 
We conclude that Oliner and Rudebusch (1996) were right to point out the importance of 
distinguishing between firm types, but for the UK, the effects of making this distinction do not 
undermine the findings of Kashyap et al. (1993). We observe that the empirical evidence supports 
Oliner and Rudebusch (1996) since we confirm that size is an important determinant of short term 
debt availability but other evidence based on other characteristics of the firm such as collateral 
assets, risk scores and profitability, suggest that size is not the only influence on the availability of 
credit.  We  conclude  that  many  firm-specific  characteristics,  including  size,  are  important 
determinants of access to short-term and long-term credit. 
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TABLE 1-A: The impact of firm-specific characteristics on access to credit 
 




RATE  -0.219***  -0.251***  -0.516***  -0.575*** 
  (2.74)  (3.15)  (10.33)  (11.55) 
SIZE  -4.534***  -3.755***  4.081***  3.982*** 
  (18.89)  (16.35)  (27.07)  (27.73) 
RISK SCORE  -0.355***  -0.287***  -0.416***  -0.446*** 
  (58.35)  (50.29)  (108.73)  (124.21) 
COLLATERAL  -38.492***  -37.797***  14.210***  13.987*** 
  (41.36)  (41.44)  (24.35)  (24.43) 
GEARING  -0.003***    0.003***   
  (17.48)    (32.16)   
PROFIT  0.028***  0.019***  -0.006***  -0.003*** 
  (16.47)  (14.24)  (5.63)  (3.32) 
AGE  0.681***  0.604***  0.208***  0.176*** 
  (10.06)  (9.00)  (4.92)  (4.18) 
GDP  -0.454***  -0.478***  -0.556***  -0.570*** 
  (5.28)  (5.59)  (10.36)  (10.65) 
Constant  123.340***  113.807***  22.018***  27.052*** 
  (38.83)  (36.70)  (11.05)  (13.91) 
year92  -1.028***  -1.160***  2.232***  2.369*** 
  (3.38)  (3.84)  (11.70)  (12.46) 
year93  -1.452***  -1.548***  0.806***  0.723*** 
  (4.22)  (4.52)  (3.74)  (3.37) 
year95  -0.352  -0.294  0.192  0.300* 
  (1.40)  (1.17)  (1.22)  (1.91) 
year96  -0.754***  -0.744***  0.014  0.002 
  (2.96)  (2.93)  (0.09)  (0.01) 
yea97  0.206  0.246  0.744***  0.845*** 
  (0.74)  (0.89)  (4.28)  (4.86) 
year98  0.232  0.306  1.403***  1.475*** 
  (0.73)  (0.97)  (7.04)  (7.41) 
         
Obs  105750  109900  107428  112697 
No of firm  14750  14980  14804  15062 
R-squared  0.06  0.05  0.17  0.17 
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TABLE 1-B: Effects of debt interacted with other characteristics 
 
 
Short Term Debt/Total Debt  Total Debt/Total Liabilities 
RATE  -0.216***  -0.214***  -0.216***  -0.509***  -0.519***  -0.511*** 
  (2.71)  (2.68)  (2.71)  (10.24)  (10.42)  (10.30) 
SIZE  -4.485***  -4.429***  -4.396***  4.051***  4.117***  4.054*** 
  (18.68)  (18.46)  (18.32)  (26.89)  (27.32)  (26.93) 
RISK SCORE  -0.341***  -0.333***  -0.327***  -0.424***  -0.430***  -0.434*** 
  (55.95)  (54.30)  (53.22)  (110.87)  (111.48)  (112.67) 
COLL  -37.953***  -38.710***  -38.276***  14.297***  14.454***  14.346*** 
  (40.54)  (41.11)  (40.66)  (24.39)  (24.50)  (24.34) 
AGE  0.676***  0.673***  0.662***  0.224***  0.212***  0.230*** 
  (10.03)  (9.97)  (9.84)  (5.31)  (5.03)  (5.46) 
GEARING  -0.009***  -0.004***  -0.010***  0.008***  0.004***  0.008*** 
  (24.59)  (14.43)  (19.56)  (33.48)  (23.17)  (25.70) 
GEARING*SMALL  0.000    0.000  0.001***    0.000 
  (1.22)    (0.25)  (2.80)    (0.95) 
GEARING*RISKY  0.008***    0.007***  -0.005***    -0.004*** 
  (24.27)    (18.45)  (22.20)    (16.23) 
GEARING*LCOLL  -0.000    0.000  0.001***    0.001*** 
  (0.54)    (0.30)  (6.58)    (4.27) 
GEARING*LPROFI
T 
-0.002***    0.000  -0.002***    -0.003*** 
  (5.09)    (1.18)  (9.45)    (10.81) 
GEARING*LARGE    -0.000  0.000    -0.001***  -0.001*** 
    (0.13)  (0.07)    (6.86)  (5.74) 
GEARING*SECURE    -0.015***  -0.011***    0.011***  0.008*** 
    (21.66)  (15.38)    (25.36)  (18.16) 
GEARING*HCOLL    0.001***  0.001***    -0.001***  -0.001*** 
    (3.92)  (3.53)    (5.50)  (2.83) 
GEARING*HPROFI
T 
  0.004***  0.005***    0.000  -0.002*** 
    (11.66)  (11.50)    (0.80)  (6.75) 
PROFIT  0.031***  0.021***  0.025***  -0.013***  -0.007***  -0.011*** 
  (16.95)  (11.37)  (13.25)  (11.60)  (6.09)  (9.08) 
GDP  -0.444***  -0.450***  -0.442***  -0.562***  -0.557***  -0.563*** 
  (5.19)  (5.26)  (5.17)  (10.52)  (10.41)  (10.56) 
year92  -1.002***  -1.025***  -1.004***  2.208***  2.227***  2.209*** 
  (3.30)  (3.38)  (3.32)  (11.63)  (11.72)  (11.66) 
year93  -1.452***  -1.417***  -1.430***  0.823***  0.782***  0.802*** 
  (4.23)  (4.13)  (4.17)  (3.84)  (3.64)  (3.74) 
year95  -0.335  -0.334  -0.318  0.172  0.183  0.164 
  (1.34)  (1.33)  (1.27)  (1.09)  (1.17)  (1.04) 
year96  -0.700***  -0.715***  -0.672***  -0.026  -0.009  -0.043 
  (2.75)  (2.81)  (2.65)  (0.16)  (0.06)  (0.27) 
year97  0.241  0.223  0.260  0.716***  0.743***  0.709*** 
  (0.87)  (0.81)  (0.94)  (4.13)  (4.28)  (4.10) 
year9  0.255  0.241  0.267  1.374***  1.406***  1.376*** 
  (0.80)  (0.76)  (0.84)  (6.92)  (7.08)  (6.94) 
Constant  122.286***  121.762***  121.440***  22.103***  22.200***  22.323*** 
  (38.56)  (38.40)  (38.34)  (11.12)  (11.16)  (11.25) 
Observations  105750  105750  105750  107428  107428  107428 
Number of firm  14750  14750  14750  14804  14804  14804 
R-squared  0.06  0.06  0.07  0.18  0.18  0.19 
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses             
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%             
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TABLE 2: Allowing for interactions with the interest rate 
 
  Short Term Debt/Total Debt  Total Debt/Total Liabilities 
RATE  -2.479***  -2.518***  -0.965***  -1.170*** 
  (12.76)  (13.33)  (7.88)  (9.82) 
SIZE  -7.586***  -6.811***  3.834***  3.626*** 
  (27.26)  (25.34)  (21.85)  (21.43) 
SIZE*RATE  0.345***  0.347***  0.037***  0.051*** 
  (18.90)  (19.17)  (3.23)  (4.51) 
RISK SCORE  -0.219***  -0.146***  -0.449***  -0.482*** 
  (16.37)  (11.85)  (53.87)  (62.77) 
RISK 
SCORE*RATE 
-0.019***  -0.020***  0.004***  0.005*** 
  (12.26)  (13.71)  (4.30)  (5.11) 
COLLATERAL  -46.421***  -46.483***  19.790***  19.231*** 
  (31.13)  (31.65)  (21.08)  (20.80) 
COLLATERAL* 
RATE 
1.007***  1.100***  -0.737***  -0.694*** 
  (6.62)  (7.32)  (7.71)  (7.36) 
GEARING  -0.003***    0.003***   
  (7.73)    (12.32)   
GEARING*RATE  0.000    0.000   
  (1.10)    (0.05)   
PROFIT  0.033***  0.018***  0.003  0.003 
  (7.34)  (4.86)  (0.90)  (1.18) 
PROFIT*RATE  -0.000  0.000  -0.001***  -0.001*** 
  (0.83)  (0.61)  (3.38)  (2.62) 
AGE  0.874***  0.811***  0.094***  0.076** 
  (15.38)  (14.41)  (2.63)  (2.14) 
AGE*RATE  0.013***  0.014***  -0.004***  -0.004*** 
  (11.30)  (11.61)  (5.05)  (4.90) 
GDP  1.092***  1.161***  -1.326***  -1.249*** 
  (3.42)  (3.66)  (6.60)  (6.24) 
GDP*RATE  -0.183***  -0.193***  0.084***  0.073*** 
  (4.87)  (5.18)  (3.54)  (3.10) 
year94  0.561*  0.521  1.521***  1.746*** 
  (1.71)  (1.60)  (7.35)  (8.48) 
year95  0.571**  0.674**  -0.201  -0.042 
  (2.16)  (2.56)  (1.21)  (0.25) 
year96  -0.107  -0.060  -0.319**  -0.288* 
  (0.42)  (0.24)  (1.98)  (1.80) 
year97  0.410  0.454*  0.755***  0.869*** 
  (1.48)  (1.65)  (4.34)  (5.00) 
year98  0.493  0.560*  1.447***  1.531*** 
  (1.57)  (1.79)  (7.33)  (7.77) 
Constant  133.830***  123.803***  30.568***  36.101*** 
  (41.56)  (39.56)  (15.06)  (18.29) 
Obs  105750  109900  107428  112697 
No of firm  14750  14980  14804  15062 
R-squared  0.07  0.06  0.18  0.17 
 
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
       